KHARTOUM, October 13 — The story begins with a growing chorus in Sudan calling for a change of government, led by Dr Ismail Satty, who has repeatedly urged Prime Minister Dr Kamil Idris to step aside amid mounting political, economic, security and administrative crises. What unfolded in recent days, according to Sudan Horizon News, is not merely a debate over personnel but a deeper reckoning with how power functions in the state.
At its heart lies a simple but urgent question: are the roots of Sudan’s failure found in the individuals holding office, or in the system that shapes their actions? Dr Satty’s call for change has found support among those who judge the government by its performance and hold it accountable for deteriorating conditions.
Others argue that replacing the Prime Minister or reshuffling ministers could interrupt the cycle of decline. Yet even as these voices grow louder, the same report warns that before any such step is taken, the foundational question must be addressed: does the problem lie with the people in power, or with the structure within which they operate?
Answering this requires a shift from fragmented thinking — which blames crises solely on the performance of officials — to systems thinking, which looks beyond individuals to the relationships, mechanisms and interactions that define how institutions function. The report insists that anyone in public office does not act in a vacuum.
Their power is shaped by formal and informal rules, jurisdictional overlaps, competing interests and established patterns of behaviour that determine what they can achieve, no matter their intentions or competence. Replacing a minister while leaving these structural relationships intact may produce only temporary change. If the problem stems from poor coordination, fragmented decision-making, weak accountability, or a disconnect between planning and implementation, a new appointee will likely encounter the same constraints as their predecessor.
The machine may run differently for a while, but if the design remains flawed, the same outcomes will reappear. Systems thinking, as outlined in the report, begins with the idea that a government’s performance depends not just on the qualities of its ministers, but on how institutions, agencies, resources, information and decisions interact. A well-qualified minister may still be ineffective if their authority is undermined, their plans lack implementation mechanisms, or they operate amid conflicting interventions.
Assessing government performance, therefore, must go beyond individual competence to examine the clarity of responsibilities, the integration of institutions, the match between power and duty, the flow of information, and the effectiveness of coordination and accountability mechanisms. It must also consider whether the state’s components operate under a shared vision or are pulled apart by conflicting priorities.
These factors — not just personal ability — determine whether individual efforts translate into coherent action and tangible results. The debate, the report concludes, must shift from judging individuals to diagnosing the system that shapes their behaviour. Only by examining the relationships and mechanisms that produced past failures can Sudan hope to achieve different, sustainable outcomes.
What to watch next is whether this call for structural reflection will influence the ongoing discourse on reform — or whether the temptation to change faces, not frameworks, will prevail.
